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The instrument problem in monetary policy is back on the agenda. Until recently 
interest  rate  policy  was  widely  thought  to  be  sufficient  for  the  attainment  of 
appropriate monetary  policy goals. No longer. In the  wake  of the international 
financial crisis there is much pressure on monetary authorities to incorporate the 
goal of financial stability more explicitly in policy. This requires an expansion of 
the  instruments  typically  used  by  central  banks.  Cechetti  and  Kohler  (2010) 
recently  considered  this  new  version  of  the  instrument  problem  in  monetary 
policy  by  analysing  the  distinct  role  and  potential  for  co-ordinating  (i)  interest 
rates  and  (ii)  capital  adequacy  requirements.    In  this  paper  we  connect  this 
modern  debate  with  an  earlier  version  of  the  instrument  problem,  famously 
discussed by Poole (1970). Then, as now (we claim), the main message of the 
analysis is the non-equivalence of these instruments and the structural features 
of the economy on the basis of which one would prefer a particular combination of 
these instruments. These results are demonstrated with a set of simulations.  We 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Forty years ago, William Poole published a paper titled “Optimal choice of monetary policy instrument 
in  a  simple  stochastic  macro  model”  that  would  later  become  famous.  The  paper  addressed  a 
controversy of the early 1970s that echoes in 2010: the choice of the appropriate monetary policy 
instrument or, specifically, the extent to which other instruments in addition to a short-term interest 
rate are necessary or desirable. The question is, if anything, even more important in the wake of the 
international financial crisis.  
 
Following a financial crisis that has undermined a monetary policy consensus that drew at least partly 
on Poole‟s results, Cechetti and Kohler (2010) return to this theme, but with a twist . We offer a 
reading of the Cechetti and Kohler (2010) paper by starting with Poole‟s and then exploring how the 
concerns of the day found their way into their paper, before offering minor criticisms of their approach 
and suggesting some tentative alternatives.  
 
2.  The instrument problem in 1970 
 
William Poole wrote his famous paper at a time of considerable uncertainty for monetary economists 
and central bankers: the Bretton-Woods system was in terminal decline, inflation was rising and the 
confidence of central bankers was ebbing. Of course, the decade would unfold with what Arthur Burns 
(1979) called the “anguish of central banking”: the disconcerting realisation that central bankers had 
both the desire to attain the goals of monetary policy and apparently powerful policy tools at their 
disposal, and yet they failed dramatically to achieve these ends. The story of how central bankers 
overcame  their anguish over the  subsequent two decades has been told many times,  especially  by 
Marvin Goodfriend (e.g., 2007) and others (Svensson, 2006; Mishkin, 2007). There is no need for a 
repetition of the story, apart from mentioning that the move towards the systemic policy procedure 
that characterises the modern approach to monetary policy built in an important way on the formal 
approach to the instrument problem in papers such as that of Poole (1970).  
 
The question on Poole‟s table was whether central banks should (i) use money stock, (ii) a short-term 
interest rate as a policy instrument or (iii) a combination of the two.  We see the problem statement in 
Cechetti  and  Kohler  (2010)  as  quite  similar  to  this  as  they  consider  the  policy  instrument  choice 
between (i) an interest rate, (ii) a balance sheet instrument, specifically capital adequacy ratios, or (iii) a 
combination of the two. A balance sheet instrument can be any policy instrument aimed at affecting the 
balance sheet of banks and/or that of the central bank. 4 
It is this similarity that upon reading Cechetti and Kohler (2010) reminds one of Poole‟s (1970) paper. 
Similar to Cechetti and Kohler (2010), the older paper also opened with an equivalence result: in an 
investment/saving curve and the liquidity preference/money supply equilibrium curve (ISLM) model 
similar to that of Cechetti and Kohler (2010) but without stochastic disturbances, the two monetary 
policy instruments are equivalent. But that is not the message of Poole‟s (1970) paper, and we argue 
that it is not the message of Cechetti and Kohler (2010) either
1.  
 
In both papers, the major results are that  the equivalence of the instruments holds only in an unlikely 
special case, not in general, and hence there is potential for their co-ordinated use. This is why we 
pencilled in the word “non” in front of “equivalence” in the title. It is the non-equivalence of these 
instruments that challenges monetary authorities: they have to choose between, or co-ordinate the use 
of these instruments, and models such as those of Cechetti and Kohler (2010) help one to understand 
the choice.  
 
In  the  earlier  paper,  the  model  is  a  stochastic  ISLM  model  with  a  quadratic  loss  function.  The 
important result derived with that model was that the structural parameters of the model (the slopes of 
the IS and LM curves), and the relative sizes of the stochastic disturbances in the real economy and the 
asset markets determined the most efficient policy tool. Our view of the structural characteristics of the 
economy will accordingly affect our choice of policy instrument. Poole (1970) showed that, in his 
model,  the  interest  rate  was  the  preferred  instrument  when  shocks  to  the  monetary  sector  were 
relatively large compared to shocks to aggregate expenditure. The money stock was preferred when 
shocks to the monetary sector were relatively smaller.  
 
His next step was to investigate the scope for the co-ordinated use of the interest rate and money stock 
to improve policy outcomes. This joint optimisation outperformed what could be attained by using 
either of the two instruments individually, but subject to the monetary authority having knowledge 
about more structural parameters than is required for the single instrument alternatives. Based on this 
result, Poole (1970:209) suspected that “a combination policy based on intuition may be worse than 
either of the pure policies”. The bias against intuition in monetary policy-making has deepened since 
then, as Alan Blinder (1998: 9) observed almost 30 years later: “You can get your information about the 
economy from admittedly fallible statistical relationships, or you can ask your uncle. I for one,” he 
continued, “never hesitated over this choice”.  
 
                                                 
1 Even though the title of their paper suggests that it is. 5 
3.  The instrument problem in 2010 
 
Before the financial crisis, central banks implemented the modern consensus – perhaps the most widely 
known formulation is Bernanke and Gertler (1999) – that they should not respond ex ante to asset 
market fluctuations over and above the consequences of these fluctuations for the outlook on inflation 
and real output. Financial stability and price stability are complementary under (explicit or implicit) 
flexible inflation targeting in this view (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999: 18, 22).  
 
While there were good reasons for not incorporating asset prices as a distinct objective of the interest 
rate policy of monetary authorities, the severity of the international financial crisis has encouraged a 
revision of this “mop-up-afterwards” approach to asset bubbles (e.g., Mishkin, 2008; Blinder, 2008). A 
finer distinction is now being drawn between types of asset price bubbles, with the old consensus still 
believed to be applicable to bubbles on the stock market and where bank credit played a small part 
(“equity bubbles” in the terminology of Mishkin (2008)), but not for asset bubbles where the provision 
of cheap credit by banks plays a central role (“credit bubbles” in the terminology of Mishkin (2008)).  
 
In these credit bubbles, neither the knowledge problem nor the instrument problem is thought to be as 
severe as previously suspected, or so the argument goes. A central bank that also plays the role of bank 
regulator and supervisor has much better information about bank lending and potentially about the 
prudence of that lending compared with knowledge about the fundamental support for stock market 
prices. In addition, central banks have a range of regulatory powers that can be used to reign in credit 
lending that is supporting an asset bubble; instruments that act directly on the behaviour of banks.  
 
This distinction is sensible and is a lens through which plausible ex post readings of cases such as the 
“Great crash” of 1929, the Japanese asset price boom and bust, and the recent financial crisis have been 
offered by Mishkin (2008). However, to act against credit bubbles requires an ex ante analysis of the 
bubble, and there is not much evidence that the United States Federal Reserve System (US Fed) (or 
other major central banks) was able to do that with respect to the recent crisis. Indeed, former US Fed 
Deputy Governor Alan Blinder considered the risks to various dimensions of US monetary policy at 
Jackson Hole in August 2005 (when the credit bubble was well under way) and summarised his results 
in  a  risk  management  matrix.  It  indicated  moderate  risks  to  inflation,  employment  and  aggregate 
demand, and a high risk of a supply-side shock. Crucially, he identified the level of risk for both the 
banking sector and credit risk to be low, stable and covered by strong risk management (Blinder, 2005: 
Table 1).  
 6 
This demonstrates the need for better monetary policy models so that an observer in Blinder‟s (2005) 
position would have identified the emerging credit and banking-sector risks. Without these changes, the 
distinction between credit and equity bubbles brings central banks no closer to a practical engagement 
with the risks of asset bubbles. This also provides the motivation for the kind of model proposed by 
Cechetti and Kohler.  
 
3.1  Cechetti and Kohler’s (2010) model 
 
The starting point for the Cechetti and Kohler (2010) paper is the recognition that financial stability is 
widely recognised as a critical objective for monetary authorities. Indeed, this objective is now, as it has 
been in the past, a major reason for having a monetary authority at all. This was certainly part of the 
policy consensus before the crisis, as is reflected in almost any list of prescriptive statements about 
what central banks should do, for example, the following list from Mishkin (2007):  
 
1.  Price stability should be the long-run goal of monetary policy 
2.   Central banks should adopt an explicit nominal anchor 
3.  The central banks should be goal-dependent and held accountable to the public 
4.   However, the central bank should have instrument independence 
5.   A central bank should be transparent, especially through an extensive communication strategy 
6.   A central bank should have the goal of financial stability.  
 
Number 6 stands somewhat apart from the first five suggestions and is only implicitly captured by the 
consensus on inflation targeting. The connection between inflation targeting and financial stability is 
perhaps closest to explicit in the literature on appropriate responses to asset price bubbles where, for 
example, Bernanke and Gertler (1999:18) connected the “sustained damage to the economy” by an 
asset price collapse with a failure by central banks to act against deflationary pressures.  
 
Notwithstanding  the  aforementioned,  the  goal  of  financial  stability  is  widely  recognised  (Crockett, 
1997; Goodhart, 2005; Svensson, 2009) and brings particular modelling challenges. The central bank‟s 
role in prudential supervision implies an ability to identify risks to financial stability in a forward-
looking  manner,  and  the  ability  to  assess  the  risks  associated  with  the  current  and  likely  future 
circumstances of the financial sector, conditional on policy actions such as (i) the stance of monetary 
policy, (ii) the lender-of-last-resort facility and (iii) „softer‟ instruments such as financial stability reports 
by financial firms (Bårdsen et al., 2006).  
 7 
While all central banks assess these risks, they often do so without the aid of formal models that 
connect economic developments, policy and financial fragility. Before the crisis, the policy decision 
with respect to the nominal anchor was often separated from regulatory decisions aimed at financial 
stability. This “division of responsibility”, as Cechetti and Kohler (1970:2) rightly observe, “has not 
survived the crisis”. One now has to find a way to co-ordinate these two aspects in a more or less 
explicit manner.  
 
It is at this point that the Cechetti and Kohler paper enters the debate: it is an excellent step towards a 
rigorous inclusion of financial stability in the systematic part of monetary policy. A brief summary of 
their approach follows. 
 
Instead  of  an  ISLM  model,  Cechetti  and  Kohler  start  with  a  log-linearised  stochastic  aggregate 
demand–aggregate supply ((AD–AS) model with bank capital, where AD is a function of the short-
term  real  interest  rate  and  the  real  short-term  loan  rate  at  banks.  Bank  lending  in  this  model  is 
constrained by bank capital, with the capital requirement a policy variable. To capture an aspect of the 
financial accelerator, bank capital is a positive function of real output. The demand for loans is a 
function of real output as well as the real loan rate at banks. Meanwhile, AS is simply a positive 
function  of  unexpected  inflation.  Cechetti  and  Kohler  (1970)  solved  the  model  under  rational 
expectations.  
 
3.2 The equivalence result 
 
Their  model  is  used  first  to  derive  an  equivalence  result  between  interest  rate  policy  and  reserve 
requirements for a monetary authority that tries to obtain (only) low inflation and stable output around 
its long-run potential. The optimal policy yields identical outcomes under both policies. The title of the 
paper derives from this result, but we think the really interesting results follow in subsequent sections, 
where the equivalence results no longer hold – which occurs when a monetary authority explicitly cares 
about more than just low inflation and stable output. 
 
3.3 Including financial stability 
 
The next step is to include financial stability in this monetary policy model. This is easier said than 
done, as there are a number of rival definitions of financial fragility and many of them are not easy to 
capture in a model.  
 8 
One important and intuitively appealing tradition in this literature conceptualises financial fragility in 
institutional terms, with „stability‟ defined in terms of (i) the stability and credibility of key institutions 
and (ii) the stability of key markets, such that prices reflect underlying fundamentals (see, for example, 
Crockett,  1997).  In  contrast  with  this  emphasis  on  institutions,  Mishkin  (1994)  and  others  have 
conceptualised financial instability as a disruption in the flow of information in financial markets, with 
shocks – or asset price bubbles – preventing the markets from allocating resources efficiently. The 
focus on information, and especially asymmetric information, highlights the risks of moral hazard and 
adverse selection.  
 
The measure of financial instability used by Cechetti and Kohler (1970) falls into this broad category, 
where they follow one of the proposals used by Curdia and Woodford (2010) to suggest that changes in 
the  spreads  between  the  interest  rates  charged  to  various  classes  of  borrowers  might  be  a  useful 
barometer of financial instability. The idea in Cechetti and Kohler (1970) is to include the spread 
between the loan rate and the short-term policy rate in the loss function for the monetary authorities. 
We return to the wisdom of this decision later on.  
 
Again,  they  derive  the  optimal  interest  rate  and  capital-adequacy  policy  reaction  functions.  An 
analogous result to Poole‟s emerges at this point, namely using both instruments leads to a better 
overall result than can be achieved with either of the two instruments independently. The reason for 
this is that both instruments move the traditional first two terms of the loss function in the same 
direction, while the new third term (the credit spread) is moved in the opposite direction. Using a 
second instrument to respond to the third term therefore improves the outcome.  
 
Hence, the equivalence result between the two polices no longer holds. As with Poole‟s earlier result, 
the preferred policies will depend on the structural parameters of the model. If demand shocks are 
relatively larger, then interest rate policy will be preferred and, conversely, the capital-adequacy ratio 
will be the preferred policy tool when AS shocks dominate.  
 
3.4 Policy co-ordination 
 
The final question examined in the Cechetti and Kohler (2010) paper is whether, and if so how, the two 
policy instruments might best be co-ordinated given the concern for financial stability. They consider 
the following three alternatives: 
 
1.  The  two  policy  instruments  are  set  independently,  with  the  policy-maker  in  charge  of  each 
instrument setting it independently. 9 
2.  The  two  policy-makers  jointly  optimise  the  setting  of  their  instruments  in  pursuit  of  the 
combined objective.  
3.  A  Stackelberg  strategy  is  followed  whereby  one  policy-maker  optimises  first  (ignoring  the 
consequences of that decision for the other policy-maker), after which the second instrument is 
set taking the setting of the first instrument as given.  
 
In an echo of Poole‟s result, they show that the structure of the model, in this case whether AS or AD 
shocks dominate, affects the relative ranking of these three strategies. While Cechetti and Kohler (2010) 
provided  analytical  results,  we  simulated  the  outcomes  for  the  loss  function  in  their  model  to 
demonstrate the results, by calibrating their model and calculating the outcomes over various ranges of 
the parameters in the loss function.
2 These simulations are presented below
3.  
 
Case 1: Aggregated demand shocks dominate 
Figure 1 shows the outcomes for the loss function under the three strategies for a range of relative 
weights on the credit spread. Unsurprisingly, the co-ordinated strategy is the best, but when demand 
shocks dominate, the Stakelberg strategy performs least well. Not only is the Stackelberg strategy the 
worst in this case, the losses pull further apart as the weight on financial stabilisation rises.  
 
Figure 1:   Aggregated demand shocks dominate, over a range of weights for the credit spread 
 
                                                 
2 The calibration satisfies the necessary conditions given in Cecchetti and Kohler (2010), but was chosen for illustrative 
purposes and is not rigorously motivated to represent any view on the strength of various interactions. 
3 In the graphs, ξ is the weight on inflation, λ the weight on the output gap and ζ is the weight on the credit spread in the 
loss function.  10 
 
Figure 2 shows the outcomes for the loss function under the three strategies for a range of relative 
weights on output stabilisation. 
 




Again, the Stackelberg strategy is the worst, co-ordination is by far the best, and the gap between co-
ordination and the other two widens as the weight on output stabilisation rises.  
 
In Figure 3 we plot the outcomes for the loss function when the weights on output and financial 
stabilisation vary together.  11 
Figure 3: AD shocks dominate, over a range of weights for output and financial stabilisation 
 
 
Case 2: Aggregated supply shocks dominate 
 
We  repeat  the  simulations  above,  but  under  a  scenario  where  AS  shocks  are  dominant.  The  co-
ordinated strategy is clearly preferable, but in contrast with the earlier result, the independent strategy 
performs least well when AS shocks dominate, as shown in Figure 4. Not only is the independent 
strategy the worst in this case, but the losses pull further apart as the weight on financial stabilisation 
rises. 
 12 




Figure 5 shows the outcomes for the loss function under the three strategies for a range of relative 
weights on output stabilisation. In this case, the results are more interesting. While the independent 
strategy is the worst, the gap between the strategies declines as the weight on output rises.  
Figure 5:   Aggregated supply shocks dominate, over a range of weights for output 
stabilisation 
 13 
In Figure 6, we plot the outcomes for the loss function when the weights on output and financial 
stabilisation vary together. The ranking observed in the other AS dominant cases is preserved here.  
 





Case 3: Neither aggregated demand nor aggregated supply shocks dominate 
 
Finally, we consider what happens when neither AD nor AS shocks dominate and were surprised to 
observe the sensitivity of the outcomes in this case, especially that relative rankings of the independent 
and Stackelberg strategies may reverse depending on the parameter values. 
 
Figure 7 shows the outcome when we vary the weight on output stabilisation under conditions where 
neither of the two macro shocks dominate. The outcome in this case is comparable to those for the 
dominant AD shocks, with the Stackelberg strategy clearly being the worst for the greatest portion of 
the investigated range.  
 14 
Figure 7: No dominant shocks, over a range of weights for financial stabilisation 
 
 
Figure 8 shows the outcomes for the loss function under the three strategies for a range of relative 
weights on output stabilisation. Here we find a crossover, with the independent strategy being the 
worst at very low weights on output stabilisation, but better than the Stackelberg strategy at higher 
weights.  
 
Figure 8: No dominant shocks, over a range of weights for output stabilisation 
 
 15 
Finally,  we  plot  the  outcomes  for  the  loss  function  when  the  weights  on  output  and  financial 
stabilisation vary together (Figure 9). In this final scenario, the outcomes are not very different when 
the weights on output and financial stabilisation are jointly small, but as they rise, a substantial gap 
between the co-ordinated strategy (best) and Stackelberg strategy (worst) opens up.  
 
Figure 9: No dominant shocks, over a range of weights for output and financial stabilisation 
 
 
How do we interpret these graphs? Firstly, a word of caution: these scenarios are dependent on the 
particular calibration used, and the results should not be over-interpreted. Secondly, it is clear that our 
understanding of the economy, as expressed in the relative size of demand-and-supply shocks, has an 
important implication for the  desirable  co-ordination of these  policies.  These  results echo Poole‟s 
(1970) earlier result.  
 
In the South Africa case it is perhaps instructive to think of some evidence about the likely relative size 
of these shocks. In du Plessis, Smit and Sturzenegger (2008), a structural vector autoregression (VAR) 
was used to identify aggregate demand-and-supply shocks for the South African economy since the 
early 1960s. Figure 10 shows the cumulative impact on real output for the identified shocks. It is a 
visual confirmation of the formal result indicating that AS shocks have been somewhat more important 
in South Africa over this period. Drawing on the Cechetti and Kohler (2010) results, this suggests that a 
Stackelberg  strategy, whereby  the  Monetary Policy  Committee (MPC) takes into account  the  prior 
decision of the financial stability authority, will improve on independence for these two decisions.  
 16 
Figure 10:   The impact of aggregated demand and aggregated supply shocks to real output in 
SA 
 
Source: Du Plessis, Smit and Sturzenegger (2008) 
 
4.  Critical reflection 
 
There is no question that Cechetti and Kohler (2010) is an important and interesting step towards 
operationalising the emerging consensus that monetary policy needs to incorporate financial stability 
much more directly in the systematic part of the policy procedure. To do this, one needs to give 
tractable content to the concept of „financial stability‟ or „instability‟.  
 
Cechetti and Kohler followed Curdia and Woodford‟s (2010) use of the spread between loan and short-
term rates as a proxy for financial instability. There is, of course, good reason for this, as Curdia and 
Woodford (2010:4) observed: “Among the most obvious indicators of stress in the financial sector 
since  August 2007 have been  the  unusual  increases in  (and  volatility  of) the spreads between  the 
interest rates at which different classes of borrowers are able to fund their activities.” 
 
They, in turn, followed earlier suggestions by McCulley and Toloui (2008) and Taylor (2008) to use 
such a spread to adjust the intercept in the Taylor rule. Curdia and Woodford (2010) showed, however, 
that a simple adjustment of the Taylor rule to include a credit spread would outperform the standard 
Taylor rule, in their words:  
 17 
But flexible inflation targeting, if properly implemented, is superior to even a spread-adjusted rule – at 
least to simple rules of the kind proposed by Taylor (2008) or McCulley and Toloui (2008). A forecast-
targeting central bank will properly take account of many credit spreads rather than just one; it will take 
account of whether changes in credit spreads indicate disruptions of the financial sector as opposed to 
endogenous responses to developments elsewhere in the economy, and it will calibrate its response 
depending on its best guess about the likely persistence of disturbances on a particular occasion. (P. 32.) 
 
Cechetti and Kohler did not simply include the spread in a Taylor rule. Instead, they included it in the 
loss function, and then solved the optimal policy problem, avoiding some of Woodford‟s concerns. 
However, there are a number of potential pitfalls in this approach that require careful attention before 
using it to rank the optimality of different policy regimes. 
 
First, the use of a quadratic loss function with a linearised economy has a long tradition in monetary 
economics, as it allows the direct application of familiar and powerful results in a linear quadratic 
optimal control framework, among other reasons (Woodford, 2003:383). It is, however, important to 
note  that  the  validity  of  the  answers  depends  crucially  on  the  structure  underlying  the  linearised 
approximation. Woodford (2003: Chapter 6) shows that it is not obvious that optimising with such a 
loss function will lead to aggregate welfare maximising rules. He shows that a quadratic loss function 
(in inflation and the output gap) can indeed be derived from a second-order approximation of the 
expected  utility  of  the  representative  agent,
4  but that it depends on the point around which the 
approximation is taken. This result hinges, in turn, on structural features of the specific model 
concerned, for example, equilibrium distortions due to monopolist ic competition, sticky prices and so 
forth. 
 
Second, while Curdia and Woodford‟s (2010) model is written in linear approximation that appears very 
similar to that of Cecchetti and Kohler (2010), there are important differences, for example, Curdia and 
Woodford (2010) derive the linear approximation from micro foundations where there are two types of 
consumers so that in equilibrium there is borrowing and lending. It also yields a Phillips curve that 
depends on additional terms (e.g., the marginal utility gap between the two types of agent), which is not 
present in the stylised economy of Cecchetti and Kohler (2010). 
 
Third, even if a simple loss function adjustment could account correctly for the aggregate utility cost of 
various policies and the linearised model captures enough of the dynamics to be accurate in the setting, 
the way the spread enters the loss function (as a quadratic term) is itself problematic. We are sceptical 
                                                 
4 Which is the axiomatic starting point of the micro foundations of welfare analyses in these types of models 18 
of the claim that credit spreads indicate financial instability as strongly as suggested by a squared term. 
As is stands, it suggests sharply rising concern about financial fragility, even at faulty low credit spreads. 
 
Fourth, Curdia and Woodford show that the optimal response of the policy rate to various shocks is 
not simple: in response to a financial sector shock that widens the spread, it is optimal to increase the 
policy rate, while in response to other shocks (say monetary policy) that increase the spread, it is 
optimal to decrease the interest rate. Clearly, a simple Taylor rule with only a positive or negative 
coefficient on the spread cannot capture this. While Ceccheti and Kohler derive rules from the loss 
function  rather  than  imposing  them,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  will  be  enough  to  allow  the  rule  to 
approximate the optimal policy path that Curdia and Woodford derive as a benchmark to measure the 
performance of rules. 
 
As a final word, we would like to encourage readers to think broadly about the inclusion of financial 
fragility in the policy procedure. An alternative that we find promising follows the work of Goodhart, 
Sunirand  and  Tsomocos  (2006),  who  have  suggested  a  new  definition  of  financial  fragility  that  is 
explicitly aimed at modelling the welfare effect of financial instability, which emerges as an equilibrium 
outcome in the model. At the heart of their concept of financial instability is the combination of (i) 
high probability of default for banks and (ii) low profitability for banks. This allows for the formulation 
of a model that is designed to analyse the consequences of risk taking by individual banks, the possible 
contagious relationship between banks, and a framework for analysing regulatory policy and its effect 
on financial fragility (Goodhart et al., 2006). Unfortunately though, these models are still so complex 
that analytical solutions cannot yet be derived.  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The instrument problem in monetary policy is back on the agenda. Until recently interest rate policy 
was widely thought to be sufficient for the attainment of appropriate monetary policy goals. No longer. 
In the wake of the international financial crisis there is much pressure on monetary authorities to 
incorporate the goal of financial stability more closely in policy. This requires an expansion of the 
instruments typically used by central banks.  
 
In recent paper Cechetti and Kohler (2010) analysed this modern version of the instrument problem in 
a similar manner to Poole‟s (1970) treatment of same issue. The earlier paper compared the expected 
impact of (i) the money stock and (ii) a short-term interest rate or (iii) some combination of these as 
instruments for monetary policy. Cechetti and Kohler (2010) reflects the modern concern with macro-19 
prudential  policy  by  analysing  (i)  a  short-term  interest  rate,  (ii)  a  change  in  capital  adequacy 
requirements or (iii) some combination of these as instruments for monetary policy 
 
In both cases, the major results are the non-equivalence of the instruments and the potential for their 
co-ordinated use. This is why we pencilled in the word “non” in front of “equivalence” in the title. It is 
the non-equivalence of these instruments that challenges monetary authorities: they have to choose 
between, or co-ordinate the use of these instruments. In the modern version the need for co-ordination 
arises from the desire to include financial stability more directly in the monetary policy decision.    
 
Cechetti and Kohler (2010) analysed the policy problem with and AD-AS model with bank capital and 
the credit spread as a proxy for financial stability. They include the credit spread in the central bank‟s 
loss function. We offered some criticism of this modelling decision, the main contours of which are: 
that (i) the micro-foundations of the quadratic loss function may be weak, (ii) that credit spread should 
not be treated symmetrically as it is in a quadratic loss function.  
 
Finally, we simulated the output of the Cechetti and Kohler (2010) model to show how the preferred 
policy combination depends on the underlying structure of the economy. These simulations consider 
three alternatives:  
 
1. The  two  policy  instruments  are  set  independently,  with  the  policy-maker  in  charge  of  each 
instrument setting it independently. 
2. The two policy-makers jointly optimise the setting of their instruments in pursuit of the combined 
objective.  
3. A  Stackelberg  strategy  is  followed  whereby  one  policy-maker  optimises  first  (ignoring  the 
consequences of that decision for the other policy-maker), after which the second instrument is 
set taking the setting of the first instrument as given.  
 
When AD shocks dominate, the model prefers the co-ordinated strategy for all relative weights on 
output and financial stability in the central bank‟s loss function. While the fully co-ordinated strategy is 
also preferable in an economy dominated by AS shocks the preference over the Stackelberg strategy is 
much smaller and diminished as the weight on output rises in the loss function. However, there is no 
version of the loss function that yields a preference for independent policy action. This is the tentative 
practical lesson of this paper: in an economy such as South Africa‟s where AS shocks are believed to 
play an important (even dominant) role, the central bank can improve on independent interest rate and 
capital adequacy decisions by co-ordinating these decisions either fully, or (perhaps more practically) in 
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